The Breakout from the Santerno bridgehead – 12 April 1945
During the night 11/12 April, the “form” on the Corps front was beginning to crystallise. 8th Indian Division had elements of five battalions of the 17 and 21 Indian Infantry Brigades over the Santerno and the bridgehead could be said to be firm, although small. No bridges were yet in operation due to trouble, which had been encountered in bringing equipment up to the water’s edge. The proposed bridging area was still under fire from enemy machine guns and mortars but the Indians were confident that during the early morning hours, they would be able to establish a foothold in depth and bridge the river with an ‘Ark’, The confidence provided itself to be well founded: the ‘Ark’ was in position by 0530 hours and less than an hour later, a troop of tanks, having crossed the bridge, had penetrated a thousand yards beyond the river without meeting any really serious resistance. The infantry was engaged in wide and solid expansion of their gains and the enemy’s movements indicated that he was trying to carry out a general withdrawal.
(NA 24019) Churchill Crocodile flamethrower tanks move forward near Imola, 12 April 1945.
On the left, the New Zealanders’ bridgehead was also firm, although, as light first dawned, there were still many enemy in positions close around it. In bridging, they had been more fortunate than their neighbours. They had one ‘Class 40’ bridge working before darkness began to lift and, by first light, tanks were already across together with anti tanks and carriers.
During the morning, a steady extension of the gains developed, while the enemy withdrew his armour and infantry as best he could from what had been a decisive failure. At midday, the two bridgeheads linked up and 8th Indian Division’s area beyond the river grew rapidly thereafter.
Just before two o’clock in the afternoon, the order was received from Corps Headquarters that 78th Division would pass into the bridgehead of 8th Indian Division at once. The Divisional Commander ordered 36 Brigade Group to begin its move forward.
The plan was as follows: 36 Brigade, with 48 Royal Tanks from 21 Tank Brigade (under command 8th Indian Division) and one squadron of 56 Recce Regiment, was to cross the river and extend the Indians’ bridgehead to the west. This done, 38 (Irish) Brigade Group, with the main weight of the Division’s armour under its command, was to pass over and form up facing northwards. The remainder of 56 Recce Regiment was to operate in conformity with any advance of the Irish Brigade but, on the east side of the river, in the role, which had initially been envisaged for 36 Brigade.
From the time that the word “go” was given at 1400 hrs, events moved rapidly forward. The Commander of 36 Brigade made his plan and ordered 8 A&SH to cross the river forthwith, supported by ‘B’ Squadron of 48 Royal Tanks. This force, together with ‘C’ Squadron, 56 Recce Regiment, was to capture the group of houses known as ‘Tre Case’, 1,000 yards beyond the most forward troops of the Indian Division. Having reached this objective, it was to push on to the Scolo Fossatone and, thence, if possible, northwards towards the village of Conselice.
With great speed, considering the congestion of the traffic, the battalion group succeeded in reaching its forming up area on the west bank of the river by mid afternoon. The squadron of tanks had difficulty on the road and arrangements for artillery support of the attack were also a cause of anxiety at one time, due to the speed with which everything had had to be done. Despite all, the attack was launched at 1730 hours and the infantry, with two companies up, moved steadily forward behind a barrage, supported by their tanks. Little opposition was met and, at 1855 hours, ‘Tre Case’ was reached and passed. By 1940 hours, the leading infantry were on the line of the Scolo Fossatone and every indivication pointed to a general withdrawal of the enemy.
As soon as 8 A&SH, with their supporting troops, had crossed the river, 38 Brigade, with the armoured ‘Kangaroo’ carriers and tanks, began to follow on. 1 RIrF, with the Queen’s Bays, crossed soon after six o’clock in the evening and formed up in the northern part of the bridgehead. 2 Innisks, the next to cross, were delayed by shelling on the bridge and a general congestion of traffic. They finally arrived just as it was getting dark and the Divisional Commander decided that it was too late to launch the general attack northwards that night. The battalions went into harbour areas around Mondaniga and fighting patrols were planned for the night to probe the enemy defences in preparation for an armoured advance in the morning.
36 Division’s operation, meanwhile, was developing successfully against light and scattered opposition. The Argylls were still fresh and it was decided that the advantage would be pressed on through the night independent of the Irish Brigade. This was “offensive flank protection” indeed!
The Brigade Commander ordered the battalion to strike out north westwards from its position on the line of the Fossatone dyke and seize the village of San Patrizio, on the road to Conselice. Little opposition had been met so far in the advance but the operation was hazardous nevertheless, as the left flank was widely exposed. The New Zealanders had made great steps forward from their bridgehead and were, in fact, attacking the town of Massa Lombarda at this time but they had not extended their front far to the north and a gap of nearly five thousand yards lay on the left flank of the Brigade’s proposed line of advance.
A salient factor in the appreciation, however, was the enemy’s state of disorganisation. The rapid advance from the Senio to the Santerno had thrown him from his poise and the shattering “carpet” bombing of the whole Santerno line had served to destroy his balance altogether. He had had no time to regain his grip before the ground forces were assaulting across the river and making firm their bridgeheads. At this point, he might well have expected that we should pause to draw up our tails, consolidate the bridgeheads deliberately ad launch a further punch with carefully prepared plans. Had this been done, it seems most likely that success would have been more costly; the precious momentum would have been lost and equally precious time would have been given to the enemy to organise his resources and to mount a counter attack.
As it was, this was the moment when the fresh weapon was unsheathed and, by the rapid expansion of the Indian Division’s bridgehead, it was possible to penetrate deeply into his zone of defence and yet meet only scattered and harassed element of his forces.
By 2020 hours, the Argylls had crossed the Scolo Fossatone, working in close cooperation with their squadron of Churchill tanks and reached new objectives at Zeppa Nuova and Zeppa Superiore nearly one thousand yards west of the dyke. There was fighting before these two objectives were taken and, before the end, both were burning fiercely in the night.
The advance was pressed on and, after some further sharp encounters with enemy infantry and some tanks, San Patrizio was reached by 2130 hours. During the advance, the Argylls made the most of the armour fighting with them, both as vehicles and as guns. Travelling on the tanks, they fired their automatic weapons on the enemy positions, all the while moving forward and finally overrunning what little organised resistance was met.
The benefit of the rapid three mile thrust was evident at once. The enemy was patently in a state of disruption. Trees all along the route, which had been prepared for felling and would have showed our rate of advance had they been turned into obstacles, were left standing. Shortly after arriving in San Patrizio, a ‘Rhinoceros’ self propelled gun rumbled into the village; the German crew climbed out and came over to speak to men of one of one of the Churchill tanks which, in the half darkness, they took to be one of their own. The surprise, on being taken prisoner, was typical of the general state of the enemy’s defence.
The success of this small operation was not to be allowed to prove barren. The Divisional Commander ordered 36 Brigade to press on and take the important village of Conselice at the earliest possible time. 6 RWK, who had originally been warned for a move forward from their concentration area near Lugo at 0400 hours, were alerted at midnight and ordered to move at once. They started at 0200 hours (April 13th) with ‘C’ Squadron of 48 Royal Tanks and passed over the river and on to San Patrizio, where they arrived in their vehicles shortly before dawn.
By this time, the Argylls had made firm the whole area of the village and had secured the two bridges over the Canale del Molini further west. Little difficulty had been encountered in securing these points, although there was activity at the southern bridge in the early hours of the morning when a party of six enemy approached, presumably with the intention of demolition. The party was accounted for before it could do any damage and, likewise, two enemy armoured cars, which drove up shortly afterwards, but reversed in haste. Further attempts were discouraged by the brens of the Argylls, which continued to sweep the area of the road until daylight.